

# **A FREE MAN'S WORLD?: OPEN THEISM AND THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF AUTONOMY**

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*In recent years, feminist scholarship has raised important objections to the visions of 'autonomy' produced by the enlightenment. If philosophical notions of freedom are indeed covertly male, there are clear ramifications for one's construction of God's openness and humanity's freedom. This paper will seek to explore the claims of open theism in relationship to the feminist critique, with particular attention given to the nature of 'self' and the idea of 'freedom,' and identify some questions that open/freewill theism needs to face if it is to respond to the challenges of feminism and post modernity.*

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'[H]istory is the combined result of what God and his creatures decide to do.'<sup>1</sup> So argues Richard Rice, when asserting the nature of divine love interacting with history. Thus the human will, or individual autonomy, plays a central role in the historical drama. That the individual is free to make such reality altering decisions is taken for granted in much of the literature of open theism. Certainly it has been called from time to time 'free-will theism,' a tag that proponents have been mostly happy to accept.<sup>2</sup> What's more, the

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<sup>1</sup> Richard Rice, 'Biblical Support for a New Perspective,' in *The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God*, ed. Richard Rice et al Clark H. Pinnock (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1994), 16.

<sup>2</sup> William Hasker, 'A Philosophical Perspective,' in *The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God*, ed. Richard Rice et al Clark H. Pinnock (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1994). In recent years there has been a clearer distinctions made (by some) between open theism and free will theism. For instance see the revised John Sanders, *The God Who Risks: A Theology of Divine Providence*, rev. ed. (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2007), 217-20. For the purpose of this essay I will be taking an approach akin to Alan R. Rhoda who has recently proposed a typology of 'generic open theism' to facilitate the discussion between open and non open theists. Though Rhoda does identify a number of important distinctives, I will argue that the theme of human libertarian autonomy is 'generally' prevalent across the spectrum of open and free will theists. See Alan R. Rhoda, 'Generic Open Theism and Some Varieties Thereof,' *Religious Studies* 44 (2008): 225-234.

debate of incompatibility verse compatibility is often portrayed as a grossly simplistic caricature. When Clark Pinnock presents the old two model chestnut, he suggests that the alternative view is of God as 'aloof monarch, removed from the contingencies of the world.'<sup>3</sup> Hasker wonders if what Calvinists believe is 'even coherent, let alone possible,'<sup>4</sup> and Sanders paints a picture of determinism so obviously illogical, that you would wonder why anyone would ever have fallen for such a ruse.<sup>5</sup>

Thus in arguing for what he concludes is 'basic freewill theism' (incorporating what we could also call here open theism), David Basinger concludes; 'all freewill theists maintain that God has created a world in which individuals possess libertarian freedom.'<sup>6</sup> Of course, such notions of freedom are hardly alarming in the contemporary world. As James K. A. Smith notes,

But what exactly does it mean to be free? Open theism, reflecting a contemporary consensus, assumes a libertarian notion of human freedom...To be free is to be autonomous and self-determining, free to do otherwise. Freedom is freedom of choice. It is this understanding of freedom that is enshrined in liberal democracy. This construal of freedom is so deeply ingrained in our culture, and even in contemporary theology and Christian philosophy, that it's almost impossible to think of freedom in any other way.<sup>7</sup>

Why then, take exception to the confident claims of freedom asserted by open/freewill theists? It is not only because of the tone of debate, or the dualistic system set up between freedom and determinism. Rather, it is because these claims of individual autonomy fail to deal with a different, and deeper, set of challenges. Of course, I speak of the F word. It is striking that 'open/freewill theists, as a contemporary theology, is not seriously engaged with the questions posed by *feminist* and post-structuralist theory. The idea of autonomy strikes at the heart of gender theory and challenges scholars across disciplines to move beyond the false

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<sup>3</sup> Clark H. Pinnock, 'Systematic Theology,' in *The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God*, ed. Richard Rice, Clark H. Pinnock et al (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1994), 103.

<sup>4</sup> Hasker, 'A Philosophical Perspective,' 143.

<sup>5</sup> I refer most especially to chapters 7 and 8 in Sanders, *The God Who Risks: A Theology of Divine Providence*.

<sup>6</sup> David Basinger, *The Case For Freewill Theism: A Philosophical Assesment*. (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1996), 141.

<sup>7</sup> James K. A. Smith, 'What God Knows,' *Christian Century* 122: 14 (2005): 31.

dichotomy of free and deterministic logic. Ironically (for a feminist), open/freewill theism makes appeals to human experience as a way to substantiate the claims of genuine human freedom. Pinnock states ‘the problem actually lies more in systematic theology than it does in religious experience.’<sup>8</sup> Whilst feminism would generally accuse both categories of patriarchal oppression, it is precisely experience that calls feminists to bring the notion of freedom into question. Often, it is reflection upon lived reality that causes women to question the validity of claims to freedom. When lives are not lived as free, one must wonder just who is defending such concepts and on what basis.

In this paper I will critique the open/freewill theist’s concept of freedom through the narratives that undergird ‘autonomy.’ I will argue that what is really at stake is the notion of subjectivity, an idea seemingly overlooked in the open/freewill theist debates. In arguing for the necessity of subjectivity, I will suggest some preliminary insights from feminist resources, for as one feminist has said ‘the subject is dead, long live the female subject.’<sup>9</sup>

## Unravelling Freedom

That Kantian logic forms the underbelly of the open/freewill theism defence is immediately apparent. Clark Pinnock cites human freedom as exemplary of Kant’s practical reason, pairing it, of course, with pure reason as necessary elements in his theological pursuit.<sup>10</sup> In asking and indeed privileging the question ‘what is a human being?’ Kant would make philosophy ‘pre-eminently an investigation into the nature of man and assign to it the task of discovering fixed universals behind surface differences.’<sup>11</sup> It is not surprising, therefore, to find the affirmation of universal autonomy defended in light of Kant’s ultimate aim for man – that is for man to transcend heteronomy and the entanglements of dependency.<sup>12</sup> For

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<sup>8</sup> Pinnock, ‘Systematic Theology,’ 105.

<sup>9</sup> Eileen Schlee, ‘The Subject is Dead, Long Live the Female Subject,’ *Feminist Issues* 13:2 (Fall 1993): 69–80.

<sup>10</sup> Clark H. Pinnock, *Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s Openness* (Cumbria: Paternoster Press, 2001), 153–54.

<sup>11</sup> Michael Foucault traces Kant’s development of this emphasis; a privileging of anthropology that was not found in ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ but developed in Kant’s later work. See Foucault, *Les Mots et les choses*, 352. Cited in Colin Davis, *After Poststructuralism: Reading, Stories, Theory* (London: Routledge, 2004), 129.

<sup>12</sup> Sarah Coakley notably observes that this is Kant’s response to Rousseau’s romanticism. See Sarah Coakley, ‘Gender and Knowledge in Modern Western

Kant, reason is not only the vehicle of human freedom but a form of existential truth. We are free when we demonstrate through freedom that we are indeed free.<sup>13</sup> Strangely, such enlightenment reasoning continues today in spite of, or perhaps in ignorance of, the sharp critique of reason from feminist thinkers. Almost thirty years ago, Genevieve Lloyd published 'The Man of Reason' in which she traced the association of reason with maleness, its development as a character ideal, and the way this notion of reason impoverishes both female and male.<sup>14</sup> Though, in the narrative of humanistic autonomy, we may be led to believe in the godlike individual – who breaks free rather triumphantly – what we in fact discover is the privileged education in logical method afforded naturally to the elite of society. Or in Lorraine Code's words the ideals of the autonomous reasoner are 'the artefacts of a small, privileged group of educated, usually preposterous, white men'!<sup>15</sup>

Sarah Coakley notes that analytic philosophy is not adept at reading this subtext of enlightenment reason.<sup>16</sup>

One may ask whether these enlightenment conceptions of 'autonomy' continue to infect – albeit unconsciously – the incompatibilist vision of freedom promulgated by many philosophers of religion in response to the problem of evil. What difference would it make if this were acknowledged? It would, for a start, make it impossible for the promulgators of the 'free will defence' to proceed as if incompatibilism were unproblematic in either gender or class terms.<sup>17</sup>

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Philosophy: The 'Man of Reason' and the 'Feminine' 'Other' in Enlightenment and Romantic Thought,' in *Powers and Submissions: Spirituality, Gender and Philosophy*, ed. Sarah Coakley (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 93.

<sup>13</sup> This conception of freedom is tightly woven to Kant's notion of morality. Our autonomy is always reflective of our morality and vice versa. We assume something of our freedom (based on ontological categories of reason) in the same way as we assume ourselves subject to moral laws.

<sup>14</sup> See Genevieve Lloyd, *The Man of Reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 1984), 65ff. for an evaluation of Kantian autonomy.

<sup>15</sup> Lorraine Code, 'Taking Subjectivity into Account,' in *Feminist Epistemologies (Thinking Gender)*, ed. Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter (New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall, 1993), 21.

<sup>16</sup> Galen Strawson provides an example of this within the analytic tradition. He writes that an awareness of self 'comes to every normal human being, in some sense, in childhood.' See Galen Strawson, 'The Self,' in *Personal Identity* ed. Raymond Martin and John Barresi, *Blackwell Readings in Philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 339.

<sup>17</sup> Sarah Coakley, 'Analytic Philosophy of Religion in Feminist Perspective: Some Questions,' in *Powers and Submissions: Spirituality, Gender and Philosophy*, ed. Sarah Coakley (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 99-100.

Similarly, in the open/freewill theist debate, scholars such as Pinnock and Sanders are appealing to these very notions of freedom and playing by the logician's rules with apparently no awareness that this particular notion of freedom is itself being undone.<sup>18</sup> As Rhoda notes 'the type of contingency that open theists chiefly have in mind is creaturely libertarian freedom.'<sup>19</sup> Indeed the problem goes deeper. For at the root of freedom and any ideal of autonomy is the difficulty of subjectivity. William Hasker highlights this succinctly in a standard definition of freedom.

If I am free in this sense, then whether or not the action is performed depends on me; by deciding to perform the action I bring it about that things happen in a certain way, quite different from some other, equally possible, way things might have happened had I refrained from the action.<sup>20</sup>

Though in Hasker - and in popular contemporary culture - we may simply and uncritically declare 'it is all about me,' what does it mean if there is no me?

## Subjectivity in Contemporary Thought

It must first be noted that notions of the self are not historically ubiquitous.<sup>21</sup> Historians have traced the emergence of the forms of self awareness we associate with subjectivity as a slow development. Colin Morris suggests that what we now consider to be subjectivity began conceptually in the Middle Ages and only reached its pinnacle in post-enlightenment philosophy.<sup>22</sup> Yet in the current age, the concept of subjectivity has taken, what is perhaps best described as a

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<sup>18</sup> Ironically Clark Pinnock briefly comments (as a footnote) that feminists in general, handle the complexities of power with much finesse. See Pinnock, 'Systematic Theology,' 102.

<sup>19</sup> Rhoda, 'Generic open theism and some varieties thereof,' 230. Rhoda does note that it is possible to declare open theism without an explicit commitment to libertarian notions of freedom yet maintains the observation that what we generally see at work is such a model.

<sup>20</sup> Hasker, 'A Philosophical Perspective,' 137.

<sup>21</sup> Schlee quotes Belsey in declaring '[the subject] was even an ideological construct; the subject was never an *a priori* state of being.' See Schlee, 'The Subject is Dead, Long Live the Female Subject,' 1.

<sup>22</sup> Colin Morris' highly influential 'The Discovery of an Individual' argues that in the year 1050 the social changes necessary for such a development began in European society. See Colin Morris, *The Discovery of the Individual, 1050-1200* (Toronto: Medieval Academy of America, 1987).

savage beating. Martin Heidegger was notable in his critique of the assumed separation of subject from world. Ontological factors drove him to consider our experience of the world a more pressing question and his insistence that the subject was a philosophical construct is still widely accepted.<sup>23</sup> Furthermore, in the aftermath of Freud's discovery of the subconscious, a whole new set of factors demanded consideration in the pursuit of self. The politics of subjectivity became of major concern to an expanding group of academics. Much of this political destabilisation is credited to Michael Foucault<sup>24</sup> but it is also true that a feminist reading of Freud's phallogentric model of differentiation brought about widespread suspicion regarding the ideal of personal identity.<sup>25</sup> Linda Alcoff surmises;

[T]he self-contained, authentic subject conceived by humanism to be discoverable below a veneer of cultural and ideological overlay is in reality a construct of that very humanistic discourse. The subject is not a locus of authorial intentions or natural attributes or even a privileged, separate consciousness...There is no essential core 'natural' to us.<sup>26</sup>

The critique is linked to the elevated status of freedom and the failure of the elite philosophers of modernity to consider realities unlike their own. Indeed, 'the revelation that the universal was in fact based on a distinctly male experience of selfhood galvanized feminist theory.'<sup>27</sup> While this may seem shocking news for those who assume the enlightenment model of freedom as self evident, post-structural theorists, feminists and various postmodern writers are happy to go about exploring new concepts of being beyond the

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<sup>23</sup> Nick Mansfield, *Subjectivity: Theories of the Self from Freud to Haraway* (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 23.

<sup>24</sup> Foucault is often read as completely deconstructing notions of the self, however close readers of his later work will argue that Foucault defends the subjective self and in no way abandons the self as previously assumed. See for instance Justin Infinito, 'Ethical Self Formation: A Look at the Later Foucault,' *Educational Theory* 53:2 (2003): 155-71.

<sup>25</sup> This criticism probably starts with de Beauvoir's 'The Second Sex' but reaches somewhat of a climax in the works of Irigaray and Kristeva. See Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, trans. Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010). Julia Kristeva, *Powers and Horrors: An Essay on Abjection* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982). Luce Irigaray and Margaret Whitford, *The Irigaray Reader* (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1991).

<sup>26</sup> Linda Alcoff (1988), 415, cited in Schlee, 'The Subject is Dead, Long Live the Female Subject,' 2.

<sup>27</sup> Alcoff, 415, in Schlee, 2.

unified subject. Australian Cultural theorist, Nick Mansfield, outlines the effects of this undoing.

I would have to say that not only do I not believe that an ultimate theory of the subject is possible, I also do not want one. It is the discussion itself that is of interest. It is worth noting that a genealogical approach, rather than a metaphysical approach to the subject flies in the face of one of the oldest duties of thought in the West, the Socratic/Platonic command, renewed in the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, to 'know oneself.' In postmodern theory...this very command has been seen as destructive. Much contemporary thought aims to protect us from anything as definitive as self-knowledge.<sup>28</sup>

## Changing the Subject

How might those of us who wish to defend some concept of human freedom proceed? I have already argued that we ought to be rather reserved about any straightforward reliance upon (or appeal to) enlightenment notions of freedom. Continued uncritical appeals to such concepts may simply fail in light of critiques from post modern theory.<sup>29</sup> Should we instead give up on the subject in recognition of the extensive fragmentation that permeates any notions of self? Certainly those whose chief concern is a doctrine of free-will would respond in the negative. I am sympathetic to these concerns (though the notion of freedom must in my view, systematically attend to the feminist critique). Yet I am more concerned at this stage for a framework of subjectivity that responds to the contemporary challenges. In movements towards the post-subject something critically important is surrendered. As Eileen Schlee notes;

One is tempted to quit very early in the project. But piecing together female subjectivity is yet a necessary task, given its history as a non-thing; we must seek to understand how it is constituted in order to arrive at some sort of truth about reality for women.<sup>30</sup>

Mary McClintock Fulkerson describes the next stage as 'changing the subject,' an apt description that points to a new paradigm of

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<sup>28</sup> Mansfield, *Subjectivity: Theories of the Self from Freud to Haraway*, 7.

<sup>29</sup> I have made reference to some forms of post-structuralism in this paper; however this comment is made against the wide and varied backdrop of 'postmodernism' in general.

<sup>30</sup> Schlee, 'The Subject is Dead, Long Live the Female Subject,' 69.

subjective reality.<sup>31</sup> In the final part of this paper I will suggest three areas that can illuminate this change of subject and may ultimately assist open/freewill theism in its defence of free will.

First, the subject must be placed within a historicised and communal context. Linda Alcoff argues that the subject of history must not be considered apart from history.<sup>32</sup> The failure of libertarian free will was not only the privileging of the western white male, but also the emergence of an almost archetypal picture of a free man. Given the profound paradigm shift of the twentieth century, it is of little surprise, that Kant's man of reason would be so heavily criticised and dismissed. By moving towards a historicised approach, new categories of subjectivity become available to those for whom the privileged awareness of Kant's model fails. In addition, such a move would de-divinise enlightenment notions of reason. Alcoff says of this historicising of subjectivity

This will waylay the tendency to produce general, universal, or essential accounts by making all our conclusions contingent and reversible. Thus, through a conception of human subjectivity as an emergent property of a historicized experience, we can say 'feminine subjectivity is constructed here and now in such and such a way' without this ever entailing a universalizable maxim.<sup>33</sup>

Consequently, the context of community and culture will be understood as imperative in any notion of emerging subjectivity. Some psychoanalytic schools may prove important here. As Diana Meyers writes: 'In psychoanalytic feminism, I have found a salutary corrective to philosophy's moral subject. Unlike most philosophers, psychoanalytic feminists appreciate the role of culturally transmitted imagery in shaping people's moral perception.'<sup>34</sup> Understanding the importance of context highlights the difficulty of universals and brings us to our second corrective.

The Subject must be differentiated. The idea of difference is at the core of most feminist debate. Whilst there is a complex internal debate here among gender theorists (I think particularly of the

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<sup>31</sup> Mary McClintock Fulkerson, *Changing the Subject: Women's Discourses and Feminist Theology* (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2001), 11.

<sup>32</sup> Linda Alcoff, 'Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory,' *Signs: Journal of Women, Culture and Society* 13:3 (Spring) (1988): 430.

<sup>33</sup> Alcoff, 'Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism,' 431.

<sup>34</sup> Diana Tietjens Meyers, *Subjection and Subjectivity: Psychoanalytic Feminism and Moral Philosophy* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 3.



polarity set up between the scholarship of Luce Irigaray and Judith Butler) what is common to most feminists is the insistence on moving beyond essentialised gender categories.<sup>35</sup> It is these very categories that are coded to interpret experience and construct subjectivity. In terms of feminist semiotic theories, there is a sense that this entails a dramatic increase of signifiers – a movement towards a more nuanced and problematised language. Difference is also the affirmation of gender transgression; indeed the potential for all manner of transgression. That is, subjectivity will be considered in close relationship to questions of gender identity and a move beyond so called normative gender markers. Fulkerson draws out the difference embedded in faith communities and argues that multiple shades of difference form part of the very definition of resistance and oppression.<sup>36</sup> Thus, what one community experiences as liberating is textualised in a different manner by a different community.

Finally, the Subject must be reinterpreted within epistemological categories. To recognise the subject as the 'knower' is hardly revolutionary. Self knowledge, is, as John Perry argues, the central part of a person's self concept.<sup>37</sup> Yet feminist scholar Lorraine Code, wants to critique how this has been traditionally read. In the 'S knows that *P*' epistemologies of modern philosophy, the *we* statements imply subjectivity in very limited terms (in fact Code places the same charges on anti-foundationalists such as Richard Rorty).<sup>38</sup> Here Code argues that the *knower* essentially becomes the *known* (and thus objectified) when the knower falls outside the narrow and dominant social group in western capitalist societies (educated white men). Such epistemology assumes that observation of everyday objects can be applied universally, or more specifically applied to a human subject. But Code suggests that knowing other people is equally formative. Code argues that Locke's *tabula rasa*, or Descartes' radical doubt, bypass the epistemic significance of early experience of other people.<sup>39</sup> It is in the interplay of relationship, and awareness of other subjects that we develop awareness of

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<sup>35</sup> For instance see Nick Mansfield's chapter on 'Femininity' in Mansfield, *Subjectivity: Theories of the Self from Freud to Haraway*.

<sup>36</sup> Fulkerson, *Changing the Subject: Women's Discourses and Feminist Theology*, 377-85.

<sup>37</sup> John Perry, *Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002), 190.

<sup>38</sup> Code, 'Taking Subjectivity into Account,' 23.

<sup>39</sup> Code, 33.

personal subjectivity – a point commonly missed in epistemological discussion. Code writes ‘in knowing other people, a knower’s subjectivity is implicated from its earliest development stages; in such knowing, her or his subjectivity is produced and reproduced.’<sup>40</sup> A move towards communal frameworks, and with particular emphasis on epistemology, will also affirm our previous points that subjectivity must be historicised and differentiated. If testing was requested, it would require a methodology precisely in contrast to Descartes’ solo pursuit. What’s more there is a reciprocal effect, by which Code asserts that not only should epistemology more broadly consider epistemological frameworks, but conversely, epistemology must always take subjectivity into account.<sup>41</sup>

Of course each of these ‘correctives’ as I have called them may be charged with relativism. There is no doubt that they mark a shift towards context. But this does not imply a denial of the real. In her argument for moral subjectivity, Diana Meyers argues that her methods ‘capture the distinctive blend of an individual’s moral capacities and ideals or the distinctive blend of society’s traditions, resources and aspirations.’<sup>42</sup> The realist/relativist dichotomy is false. There could well be another way. Indeed Code argues that the positive sides of these dichotomies have been caricatures to create a certainty that was never there.<sup>43</sup> In this sense Code argues for a common scepticism that is uncertain about definite knowledge but not so about the existence of reality.

## Subjectivity and Open/Freewill Theism

So how do these arguments about subjectivity relate to open/freewill theism? I will conclude with some brief comments on the implications of such thinking. These are merely pointers that in my mind raise the kind of questions that open/freewill theism needs to face if it is to respond to the challenges of feminism and post modernity.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Code, 38.

<sup>41</sup> Code, 39.

<sup>42</sup> Meyers, *Subjection and Subjectivity: Psychoanalytic Feminism and Moral Philosophy*, 169.

<sup>43</sup> Code, ‘Taking Subjectivity into Account,’ 40.

<sup>44</sup> An interesting critique of open theism is offered in an essay by Jason C. Robinson who calls this model of theology a full-fledged capitalist model. He notes ‘this essay was born of a sincere desire for dialogue and the belief that we cannot have deep conversation until we recognize open theism as a preconscious response to the demands for success made by those living in a free-market society.’ See Jason C.

Placing the subject within a historicised and communal context liberates the Kantian framework from false universals and places the free will defence in an entirely different playing field. Notions of freedom will thus be recognised as dynamic and playing out in the arena of history. This is, after all, congruent with the open/freewill theist's understanding of God and revelation. A dynamic communal approach to the individual's sense of self will also understand that it is not in the construction of theology or philosophy that freedom is defined, but that it is also the act of community interpreting freedom (in a multiplicity of ways). In terms of difference, the open theist is confronted with the political nature of subjectivity. Here libertarian notions of freedom are challenged to confront the questions posed by feminists; who exactly is free and how is that demonstrated? Difference seeks to uncover signifiers and move the boundaries that modern categories of reason seek to uphold at all costs.

Finally, this brings us to the systems of knowing that undergird the open theist pursuit. Where logical methods fail (as in the intractable Free-will/Calvinist debates) I would argue that the epistemological frameworks require a total reinterpretation. What does it mean to know? How can we speak of what we know? These are the paramount questions proponents of both free will and deterministic theism need to ask to rescue the debate from a mere exchange of incommensurable positions. Without a fresh reading, both schools risk becoming antiquated in the context of postmodern theory and atheism. As open/freewill theists continue to point towards the very becoming of God, then surely the discussion will begin to consider more seriously how God's freedom is becoming in this generation, right here and right now.

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Robinson, 'Freewill Theism Doing Business in a Free-Market Society' *Theology Today* 66 (2006): 175.